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1 Orin S. Kerr, ‘Searches and Seizures in a digital
world’, Harvard Law Review, 119 (2006), 531.
2 Janna Quitney Anderson and Lee Rainie, The
Future of cloud computing, (Pew Internet &
American Life Project, 11 June 2010), available at
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/The-future-
of-cloud-computing.aspx.
3 Article 22 of the Convention on Cybercrime
(Jurisdiction): 1. Each Party shall adopt such
legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish jurisdiction over any
offence established in accordance with Articles 2
through 11 of this Convention, when the offence is
committed: (a) in its territory; or (b) on board a
ship flying the flag of that Party; or (c) on board an
aircraft registered under the laws of that Party; or
(d) by one of its nationals, if the offence is
punishable under criminal law where it was
committed or if the offence is committed outside
the territorial jurisdiction of any State [….].
Although it has become clear that computer
forensics – the practical analysis of digital data
following the acquisition of a bit-stream image
of a suspect’s hard disk – suffered a setback
with the wide adoption of mobile devices and
the increasing use of flash memory and
encryption systems, it is undoubtedly also the
case that it experienced a fundamental change
due to the incredible expansion of cloud
computing systems. In this article, the aim is to
study the jurisdictional problems that cloud
computing systems cause and the possible
solutions at an EU level that have been adopted
by legislators and the courts of the European
Union in relation to the gathering of digital
evidence that may be concealed in the ‘clouds’.
Introduction 
There has been heated debate on both sides of the
Atlantic in recent years on the wisdom of empowering
law enforcement authorities to use remote forensics
technology to obtain access to the digital data
storage devices (laptops, servers, smart telephones,
etc) of suspects.
Law enforcement agencies find it increasingly
difficult to locate the servers on which incriminating
data are stored, since the perpetrators tend to rely on
remote access connections to store and process data
using faraway devices.1 The increasing popularity of
cloud computing,2 moreover, has made conventional
crime detection even more difficult: the very strengths
of cloud computing, which allows anyone anywhere in
the world to use publicly accessible software to
process data stored in a virtual cyberspace location,
could be put to devious use by criminals to store
incriminating data on a server located beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts of their country of residence,
preferably in a State with no judicial cooperation
treaty with that country.
Over the last few years, various approaches have
been offered to solve the ‘loss of location’ of digital
evidence in the ‘cloud world’. The traditional approach
is the territorial principle by virtue of which the court
in the place where the data is located has jurisdiction.
This approach essentially prohibits any type of
investigation, because even the cloud provider might
not know exactly where the data is located. Another
approach is the nationality principle by virtue of
which the nationality of the perpetrator is the factor
used to establish criminal jurisdiction. This principle
imposes certain restrictions, since the perpetrators in
a cyber crime case might easily be foreign nationals,
given that cyber crime is generally transnational and
there is no need for physical proximity. Furthermore,
data does not have a nationality, because it is an
attribute of an individual. A third approach is the ‘flag
principle’, which basically states that crimes
committed on ships, aircraft and spacecraft are
subject to the jurisdiction of the flag State, regardless
of their location at the time of the crime (article 22,
Convention on Cybercrime3). Since digital data is
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constantly changing, this principle also seems to be
applicable to cloud computing. However, to apply this
to the cloud computing scenario, it is necessary to
remember that this principle could motivate cyber
criminals to select a cloud computing provider under a
‘pirate flag’.
Finally, a recent discussion paper, prepared by the
Council of Europe within the framework of the global
Project on Cybercrime, suggested the ‘Power of
Disposal Approach’.4 From a practical point of view, a
regulation based on the power of disposal approach
would make it feasible for law enforcement officers to
obtain access to a suspect’s data within the cloud.
Law enforcement officers would only have to legally
obtain the username and password combination and
be able to prove that additional requirements have
been met. This type of approach certainly overcomes
any legal issue, but a balance must be struck with the
legitimate need for privacy and the rights of the
suspect.
Legislative measure of the Convention on
Cybercrime 
To overcome the obstacles generated by the ‘data
loss’ location of digital evidence, signatory States
have endowed their respective judicial authority and
law enforcement agencies with a number of legislative
measures in the implementation of articles 18
(Production Orders), 19 (Search and Seizure of Stored
Computer Data) and 20 (Real-time Collection of Traffic
Data), of the Convention on Cybercrime.
Under article 18 of the Convention on Cybercrime,
signatory States are required to empower their
respective judicial authorities to issue Production
Orders requiring any person or party (obviously,
including ISPs) to submit to law enforcement
authorities specific digital data in the possession or
control of the person or party in question, and stored
on a computer system or data storage medium.5
Some Italian commentators hold the view that
Production Orders could also be issued to compel the
disclosure of data pertaining to web users based
outside the boundaries of a signatory State, provided
that the users have entered into a contract for
services provided by an ISP that operates, amongst
other things, in the signatory State in question.6 This
interesting approach appears, however, to conflict
with the principle of sovereignty, and may, in any
event, be applied solely to subscriber information
(article 18(1)(b) of the Convention on Cybercrime),
since only ISPs located within the territory of the
signatory State in which the Production Order is
issued may be compelled to submit user-generated
content (article 18(1)(a) of the Convention on
Cybercrime).7
Pursuant to article 19 of the Convention on
Cybercrime, moreover, signatory States are required
to ensure that, upon discovering that pertinent digital
evidence is, in fact, stored on another server, their
respective law enforcement agencies are also
empowered to search the other server, provided,
however, that the latter is located within their national
borders, and that the digital data to be seized may be
accessed from the server initially covered by the
related search and seizure warrant.
In any event, even when searching for specific data
stored on a computer system located within the
borders of the signatory State in which the Production
Order is issued, law enforcement agencies may
encounter serious difficulties as a result of the sheer
volume of data to be parsed to find useful digital
evidence. In light of these obstacles, the Convention
on Cybercrime requires law enforcement agencies to
be empowered to compel the IT manager to provide
‘as is reasonable’ the information necessary for
successfully securing the digital evidence sought.8
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4 Jan Spoenle, Cloud Computing and cybercrime
investigations: Territoriality vs. the power of
disposal?, (31 August 2010, Council of Europe
Project on Cybercrime), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccr
ime/cybercrime/Documents/Internationalcooperati
on/2079_Cloud_Computing_power_disposal_31Au
g10a.pdf.
5 Dr Marco Gercke, Understanding Cybercrime: A
Guide For Developing Countries, (April 2009), 192,
available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/cyb/cybersecurity/projects/crimeguide.html.
6 Dott Fabio Licata, ‘La Convenzione del Consiglio
d’Europa sul cybercrime e le forme della
cooperazione giudiziaria: una risposta globale alle
nuove sfide della criminalità transnazionale’ (The
Cybercrime Convention of Council of Europe and
Cooperation between Law Enforcement
Authorities), in a workshop of Consiglio Superiore
della Magistratura, held in Rome on 19 September
2005, at 17, available (in Italian) at
http://appinter.csm.it/incontri/relaz/12009.pdf.
7 On this issue, see point 170 of the Explanatory
Report on the Convention on Cybercrime:
‘Paragraph 1 of this article calls for Parties to
enable their competent authorities to compel a
person in its territory to provide specified stored
computer data, or a service provider offering its
services in the territory of the Party to submit
subscriber information. The data in question are
stored or existing data, and do not include data
that has not yet come into existence such as traffic
data or content data related to future
communications. Instead of requiring States to
apply systematically coercive measures in relation
to third parties, such as search and seizure of
data, it is essential that States have within their
domestic law alternative investigative powers that
provide a less intrusive means of obtaining
information relevant to criminal investigations’.
8 A similar approach was adopted by the cyber
crime experts who, in 2001, drew up a Model Law
on Computer and Computer Related Crime, no.
202, for the implementation of the Convention on
Cybercrime in Commonwealth countries
(LLM(02)17, October 2002); see section 11 of the
‘Model Law’ available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_
files/uploadedfiles/%7BDA109CD2-5204-4FAB-
AA77-86970A639B05%7D_Computer%
20Crime.pdf.
Finally, article 20 of the Convention on Cybercrime
requires that law enforcement authorities of signatory
States to be afforded real-time access to web traffic
data, that is to say the electronic records of a
suspect’s on-line activities (web sites visited, e-mail
correspondents, downloads, etc). Towards this end,
signatory States must enact national legislation
requiring ISPs either to provide law enforcement
authorities with the software tools necessary for
directly collecting and recording traffic data subject to
search and seizure, or alternatively, to collect and
record such data on an ad hoc basis, pursuant to a
judicial or prosecutorial order to such effect.
As in the case of the evidentiary seizure of e-mail,
‘Production Orders’ and the ‘Real-time Collection of
Traffic Data’ contemplated in articles 18 and 20 of the
Convention on Cybercrime respectively are very
similar to the interception of communications, which
are subject to specific restrictions pursuant to article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Sadly, these three crucial ‘crime-detecting’ tools,
entrenched in the Convention on Cybercrime, are
available only in part to Italian law enforcement
agencies. Whilst the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure does, in fact, currently contemplate
procedural instruments designed to achieve the same
results (the appointment of a digital evidence
specialist to assist law enforcement officers pursuant
to article 348, paragraph 4; discovery orders within
the meaning of article 248; and interception of
communications regulated under article 266-bis), in
ratifying the Convention on Cybercrime, Italy failed to
avail itself of a significant opportunity to fine-tune
this set of ‘crime-detecting tools’. As a matter of fact,
at present, the majority of ISPs, without considering
that the Convention on Cybercrime had suggested the
adoption of ‘software tools for directly collecting and
recording traffic data subject’, submit log files and IP
addresses of suspects to law enforcement authorities
without any validation of digital evidence of the
transmission that could be achieved by adhering to
best practices of digital forensics through the use of
the hash function and an adequate time stamp.
Italian and German case law on remote
forensics technology 
Several European countries are currently considering
legislation that would invest their law enforcement
authorities with powers to remotely monitor and
record the traffic data of suspects in real time to an
extent that far exceeds the scope of the procedural
tools outlined above,9 whilst, on the other shore of
the Atlantic, the FBI has already successfully tested a
peculiar type of spyware (CIPAV) specifically designed
for such a purpose.10 In any event, it is amply clear
that by allowing law enforcement officers to monitor
the on-line activities of a blissfully unaware suspect
from the air-conditioned comfort of their offices,
remote forensic techniques have proven far more cost-
efficient and effective than conventional detective
work and, moreover, without any jurisdictional
problems.
At the same time, it would be perilous to lose sight
of the dangers that such invasive techniques might
entail in terms of the suspect’s fundamental rights
and freedoms. Great care must, accordingly, be taken
to properly weigh all the legal interests involved, and
strike a delicate balance between the prevention of
crime and public security, and the need to protect the
suspect’s due process, privacy and other human
rights.
On this issue, it is interesting to note that the
Supreme Court evinced no need to address the
constitutionality of a prosecutorial warrant – issued
pursuant to article 234 of the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure, authorizing the use of surreptitiously
installed ghost software to obtain a copy of the digital
data stored on a desktop used by the suspect and
located in a public office – on the grounds that the
related evidentiary seizure order did not pertain to a
flow of communications but merely entailed the
mining of data already stored on the suspect’s
desktop, that is to say, a ‘a one-directional flow of
data’ contained within the computer’s internal
circuitry.11
The Supreme Court moreover held that, in the case
in question, this technical activity was repeatable,
given that ‘copying the stored files neither altered the
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5
9 John Blau, ‘Debate rages over German
government spyware plan’, 5 May 2007, in
Computerworld Security, available at
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/print/90
34459/Debate_rages_over_German_government
_spyware_plan?taxonomyName=Security&taxon
omyId=17.
10 For further information on the CIPAV project, see
Kevin Poulsen, ‘FBI’s Secret Spyware Tracks
Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats’, Wired, 18
July 2007, available at
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007/07
/fbi_spyware; and Kevin Poulsen, ‘Documents:
FBI Spyware Has Been Snaring Extortionists,
Hackers for Years’, Wired, 16 April 2009, available
at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/04/fbi-
spyware-pro/.
11 Supreme Court of Cassation, 5th Criminal Section,
decision no. 16556 of 14 October 2009.
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same nor entailed the destruction of the database
which remained totally unchanged, and therefore
accessible and open to consultation, subject to the
same terms and conditions, even upon conclusion of
evidence gathering operations’. According to the
Supreme Court, the copying in question amounted to
no more than a repeatable operation that could be
undertaken without informing defence counsel, much
less inviting the latter to attend the proceedings,
since the same operation could be reproduced and
repeated a second time if need be for procedural
purposes, although such need did not arise.
During the Supreme Court proceedings, however,
counsel for the defence argued that the warrant
issued by the public prosecutor, whilst authorizing no
more than the seizure of a copy of the digital data in
question, effectively entailed the interception of
computerized communications. The scope of the
prosecutorial warrant, in fact, covered not only the
files already stored in the suspect’s computer system
through to the date of the related search and seizure,
but also to any and all data input into the system in
the future. This factual situation was confirmed by the
operating procedures followed in executing the
prosecutorial warrant, which included the
surreptitious installation of ghost software on the
computer system in question, for the purpose of
copying files already stored on the computer, and
subsequently copying in real time any and all data
processed using the computer system, before, finally,
transmitting all the data that was copied back to law
enforcement officers on a periodic basis. As a result,
the computer system used by the suspect was
effectively subjected to digital surveillance for over
eight months.
The ruling deserves criticism from two standpoints:
first, the Supreme Court does not appear to have
considered the fact that the alleged repeatability of
the copying and transmitting operations necessarily
implies that no further data processing was carried
out using the computer system in question following
the original operations; second, in support of its
refusal to apply the statutory provisions regulating
the interception and recording of communications, the
Supreme Court goes no further than to point out that
the flow of communications copied by and
transmitted to law enforcement authorities did not
pertain to electronic correspondence between two
private parties, but focused solely on a ‘unilateral
flow of communications’. Whilst this approach is
certainly reasonable, there still seems to be a cloud of
mystery shrouding both the Supreme Court’s refusal
to apply article 266-bis which regulates the
interception of a ‘flow of communications pertaining
to computerized or electronic systems, or otherwise
among several systems’, and its apparent tolerance of
highly invasive evidence gathering techniques that go
so far as to entail the prolonged monitoring of a
computer system without judicial oversight.
A totally different approach was taken by Germany.
On 20 December 2006, article 5.2(11) of the Law on
the Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-
Westphalia was amended12 with the introduction of
provisions on remote forensics instruments, both on-
line and by obtaining access to information
technology systems.
The issue first came to the attention of the general
public and legal scholars in 2006 when a state
prosecutor applied to the Federal Court of Justice of
Germany (Bundesgerichtshof ) to authorize a remote
search of computers allegedly containing data useful
to continuing investigations, by applying an analogy
to the law governing search and seizure operations
conducted on a physical premises. The court
dismissed the motion, holding that clandestine
remote searches of computers could not be deemed
analogous to raids conducted on physical premises,
but left open the possibility for new laws to be
enacted endowing law enforcement authorities with
specific search and seizure powers in respect of
electronic data. It was this latter portion of the
decision that led to the amendment of the Law on the
Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-
Westphalia.
The new provisions reinforced the domestic secret
service known as the ‘Federal Office for the Protection
of the Constitution’ (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz)
by authorizing the establishment of an agency with
the specific task of gathering intelligence by obtaining
covert access to computer systems and secretly
monitoring on-line communications and web traffic.
Private computer systems could be covertly
accessed either physically, using hardware
(interception of communications and bugs) or
127© Pario Communications Limited, 2011 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 8
12 Law on the Protection of the Constitution in North
Rhine-Westphalia (Gesetz über den
Verfassungsschutz in Nordrhein-Westfalen) as
mended on 20 December 2006, articles 5.2(11),
7.1, 5.3, 5.1 and 13 (VSG); Wiebke Abel and
Burkhard Schafer, ‘The German Constitutional
Court on the Right in Confidentiality and Integrity
of Information Technology Systems – a case
report on BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822’, (2009) 6:1
SCRIPTed 106, available at
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol6-
1/abel.asp.
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‘remotely’, thanks to software (key logger and sniffer
programs) installed on the target system without the
owner’s knowledge, for instance, in the form of
Trojans incorporated within or disguised as harmless
content, by convincing the hapless owner to
voluntarily upload the relevant spyware or disclose
passwords through cleverly devised social
engineering and phishing initiatives.13 Under the
amendment in question, the above remote forensics
operations could be launched without a warrant or
court order of any kind, and there was no specified
limit on how long a particular computer system and
on-line communication could be subjected to
surveillance.
In consideration of all these elements, the German
Constitutional Court14 determined that the
constitutionality of the amendment had to be
assessed in light of three distinct fundamental rights
enshrined in the country’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz –
GG): the privacy of correspondence:
Artikel 10
(1) Das Briefgeheimnis sowie das Post- und
Fernmeldegeheimnis sind unverletzlich.
(2) Beschränkungen dürfen nur auf Grund eines
Gesetzes angeordnet werden. Dient die
Beschränkung dem Schutze der freiheitlichen
demokratischen Grundordnung oder des Bestandes
oder der Sicherung des Bundes oder eines Landes,
so kann das Gesetz bestimmen, daß sie dem
Betroffenen nicht mitgeteilt wird und daß an die
Stelle des Rechtsweges die Nachprüfung durch von
der Volksvertretung bestellte Organe und
Hilfsorgane tritt.
Article 10
(1) The privacy of correspondence, posts and
telecommunications shall be inviolable.
(2) Restrictions may be ordered only pursuant to a
law. If the restriction serves to protect the free
democratic basic order or the existence or security
of the Federation or of a Land, the law may provide
that the person affected shall not be informed of
the restriction and that recourse to the courts shall
be replaced by a review of the case by agencies and
auxiliary agencies appointed by the legislature’.
The inviolability of the home:
Artikel 13
(1) Die Wohnung ist unverletzlich.
(2) Durchsuchungen dürfen nur durch den Richter,
bei Gefahr im Verzuge auch durch die in den
Gesetzen vorgesehenen anderen Organe
angeordnet und nur in der dort vorgeschriebenen
Form durchgeführt werden.
Article 13
(1) The home is inviolable.
(2) Searches may be authorized only by a judge or,
when time is of the essence, by other authorities
designated by the laws, and may be carried out only
in the manner therein prescribed’.
and the ‘right to informational self-determination’.15
With regard to the privacy of correspondence, the
Constitutional Court held that this fundamental
privilege extended to all types of telecommunications
regardless of the means of transmission used (cable
or broadcast, analogue or digital transmission), and
the type of transmitted content (speech, picture,
sound, or other data). However, the court went on to
assert that constitutional protection did not extend to
telecommunications data stored on computerized
devices after the communications process had been
13 Matthew Lewis, Biologger – A Biometric
Keylogger, (IRM Research Paper, December 2008)
presented at the Black Hat Conference,
Amsterdam, 27-28 March 2008, available at
http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-
europe-08/Lewis/Whitepaper/bh-eu-08-lewis-
WP.pdf; Episode 621 on Internet TV Hak5 entitled
MiTM Javascript Keylogger, Social Engineering
Toolkit and more available at
http://www.hak5.org/?s=keylogger&x=0&y=0.
This approach may not be easy to take, because
many devices (particularly mobile devices) are
protected through the use of DRM; which, in
addition to preventing the installation of
unauthorized software, provide a level of security
that would make it difficult to obtain access by
way of Trojan horses or other malicious software.
14 It is interesting to note that during the
proceedings on the constitutionality of the
amendment, in addition to three technical
experts from academia (Prof. Felix Freiling, Chair
of Computer Science at the University of
Mannheim, Prof. Andreas Pfitzmann, head of the
privacy and security group at Dresden University
of Technology and Prof. Ulrich Sieber, director at
the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Criminal Law) the German
Constitutional Court also heard a highly
experienced hacker (Andreas Bogk, freelance
hacker for Clozure, Inc., and CEO of Chaos
Computer Club Events).
15 The right ‘to informational self-determination’ is
derived from the combined provisions of article
2.1 and article 1.1 of the German Basic Law
(Grundgesetz – GG) which enshrine the rights to
‘free development of personality’ and to ‘human
dignity’, respectively. The right to informational
self-determination was established by the
German Constitutional Court for the first time in a
historic decision that led up to the passage of the
German data protection law (decision of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht of December 15, 1983,
BVerG, paragraphs 65, 1, <43>; 84, 192).
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completed. In effect this means that it is not unlawful
for the German secret service to surreptitiously copy
data from the computer hard drives of suspects.
With regard to the second fundamental right
engaged in the case, the Constitutional Court pointed
out that the principle of the inviolability of the home,
enshrined in article 13.1 of the Basic Law, only bars
law enforcement officers from trespassing on private
property in a bid to physically interfere with the
hardware located on the premises. Since remote
surveillance using Trojans or other spyware can be
conducted regardless of where the target device may
be located at any given time, location specific
protection falls far short of ensuring adequate
safeguards, especially since it is increasingly
commonplace for computers to be operated outside
or in transit between private premises.
Finally, the Constitutional Court examined the
amendment in light of the ‘right to informational self-
determination’ which protects web users against the
collection and profiling of the data they post on-line.
Once again, however, the remote forensics activities
authorized under the amendment to the Law on the
Protection of the Constitution go beyond the mere
collection of personal data for profiling purposes,
since clandestine access to just about any personal
computer could, on its own, potentially prove a
valuable discovery of highly sensitive data regarding
its owner, without the need for any further profiling of
the information collected in the process.
Having determined that the three fundamental
rights enshrined in Germany’s Basic Law afforded
inadequate protection in the circumstances, the
Constitutional Court opted to establish a new ‘right to
the confidentiality and integrity of information
technology systems’. In the same way as the ‘right to
informational self-determination’, this new ‘right to
the confidentiality and integrity of information
technology systems’ can be found in article 2.1 GG
(right to the free development of one’s personality),
read in conjunction with article 1.1 GG (right to human
dignity) and provides protection against State access
to each and every information technology system
taken as a whole, and therefore extends to all data,
whether stored or transmitted.
Although the court conceded that the right to the
confidentiality and integrity of information technology
systems is not absolute and may be restricted in the
interests of law enforcement and crime prevention, it
took pains to point out that no encroachments on the
newly created constitutional right could be tolerated,
save to the extent necessary to safeguard even more
imperative fundamental values which the court
specifically limited to the life and liberty of other
citizens, the foundational institutions of the State and
the essential values of human dignity.
Conclusion
While declaring the amendment unconstitutional by
reason of breach of the principles of proportionality
and fair labelling, the German Constitutional Court
has, however, left room for the passage of new laws
authorizing remote forensic and on-line surveillance
operations, albeit within the bounds of the principles
outlined above.
It has, quite rightly, been pointed out that ‘the
digital citizen has, as a result of this case, come a
step closer’:16 there can be no doubt that an
increasing number of individuals not only use web
technology on a daily basis, but actually ‘live’ on-line.
The internet has become a place where people make
friends, come together and exchange information and
opinions. The German Constitutional Court
acknowledged that the pre-existing legal framework
was not robust enough to adequately protect ‘digital’
citizens against unwarranted State intrusion.
By the same token, the courts could well extend the
same concept in the other direction in the future. At
present, Trojans are considered mere software tools
used by law enforcement officers to prevent, solve
and thwart crime. What if, tomorrow, the courts were
to consider Trojan fully fledged ‘digital police officers’
who inhabit cyberspace on an equal footing with
‘digital citizens’?
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16 Wiebke Abel and Burkhard Schafer, ‘The German
Constitutional Court on the Right in
Confidentiality and Integrity of Information
Technology Systems – a case report on BVerfG,
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